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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TIMOTHY KEVIN DUNCAN, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 900217-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner Timothy K. Duncan files this petition for 
rehearing. In Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912), 
the Utah Supreme Court noted the appropriate standard for filing a 
petition: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of 
right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in proper 
cases. When this court, however, has considered and 
decided all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we have 
based the decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are some 
reasons, however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing should 
be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its form 
will in no case be scrutinized by this court. 
129 P. at 624. This petition for rehearing meets the preceding 
standards in both form and substance and should be granted for the 
reasons discussed below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 10, 1991, this Court affirmed Petitioner Duncan's 
conviction for Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, -412(1)(a)(i), and Theft by 
Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-405. The Court of Appeals7 decision is attached as 
Addendum A. Mr. Duncan received one 14 day extension for filing 
this petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No factual statements are necessary; this petition 
addresses only a question of law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court found that since Michael Skillings, a State 
witness, was convicted of a misdemeanor offense, his past crime 
could not be used against him for impeachment purposes under Rule 
609(a)(1). In contrast to the Court's opinion, however, case law 
only supports its ruling when a witness for the defendant 
testifies. A rehearing is necessary to determine whether the 
protections of Rule 609(a)(1) even apply to nondefendant witnesses. 
Whenever a State witness testifies, his felony and misdemeanor 
convictions may both be used to attack his credibility. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE IMPEACHMENT PROVISION OF RULE 609(a)(1) DOES NOT 
APPLY TO NONDEFENDANT WITNESSES 
For this petition, Petitioner Duncan does not dispute 
further the Court's ruling on whether a guilty plea constitutes a 
conviction for impeachment purposes. Petitioner questions only 
whether the impeachment provisions of Rule 609(a)(1) even apply to 
nondefendant witnesses. See Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1); Fed. R. Evid. 
609(a)(1). If Rule 609(a)(1) does not apply to State witnesses like 
Michael Skillings, Skillings' credibility should have been impeached 
with evidence of his prior conviction regardless of whether it was 
classified as a felony or a misdemeanor. 
In footnote four of its opinion, this Court wrote, inter 
alia; 
Because Skillings' conviction was not punishable by 
more than one year incarceration, the requirement of 
Rule 609(a)(1) to balance the prejudicial and 
probative aspects of evidence of the conviction does 
not apply. Therefore, we do not address appellant's 
arguments about the applicability of that requirement 
where the impeached witness is not the defendant. 
State v. Duncan, Case No. 900217-CA, page 8 n. 4 (Utah App. May 10, 
1991). Ordinarily, when defense witnesses are involved, the Court's 
statements hold true. Misdemeanor convictions could not be used for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1). 
When a nondefendant witness testifies, however, not only is 
the balancing test then inapplicable the rule itself provides no 
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basis for excluding any conviction of a State witness. In harmony 
with this principle is a recent decision by the United States 
Supreme Court.1 See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 
(1989). 
In Green. the Court found "that the rule [609(a)(1)] was 
meant to authorize the judge to weigh prejudice against no one other 
than a criminal defendant." 490 U.S. at 521. A civil witness could 
therefore be impeached with evidence of his prior felony conviction 
because "only the accused in a criminal case should be protected 
from unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1)." 
Id. at 524. The Court rendered its decision after examining the 
language in the rule and its legislative history. 
"The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a 
criminal defendant certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the 
prosecution . . . ." Id. at 511. "[I]mpeaching evidence 
detrimental to the prosecution in a criminal case 'shall be 
1
 Other well-established authorities similarly recognize 
the right and importance of cross-examination, particularly by using 
prior convictions for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Leonard, 
707 P.2d 650, 655-56 (Utah 1985) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 405 (1965) ("There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the 
Supreme Court] and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than 
in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and 
cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for 
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional 
goal"); U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. 1, § 12; Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-24-1, State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-33 (Utah 1986) 
(construing Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9); Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(3); Utah 
R. Evid. 607; Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(1); cf. Utah R. Civ. P. 43(a). 
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admitted7 without any such balancing." Id. at 509. "It was the 
judgment of the [legislative] Conference that the danger of 
prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for 
the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of 
credibility as possible." Id. at 520 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
93-1597, pp. 9-10 (1974)). "Equally clear is the conferee's 
intention that the rule shield the accused, but not the prosecution, 
in a criminal case." 490 U.S. at 520. "Any prejudice [that] 
convictions [used for] impeachment [purposes] might cause witnesses 
other than the accused was deemed 'so minimal as scarcely to be a 
subject of comment.'" Id. at 522 (citations omitted). 
Just as the Green Court2 could not afford nondefendant 
witnesses the protections of Rule 609's balancing test, Petitioner 
Duncan respectfully requests this Court to find inapplicable the 
rule's impeachment provisions for Michael Skillings' misdemeanor 
conviction. If both felony and misdemeanor convictions of a State 
witness are automatically admissible for impeachment purposes, the 
Duncan decision is premised incorrectly on the assumption that Rule 
609(a)(1) even applies. Petitioner therefore requests a rehearing 
to determine whether the trial court erred in using Rule 609(a)(1) 
as a basis for excluding Skillings' misdemeanor conviction. 
2
 In State v. Smith, Case No. 900214-CA, Point I (Utah 
App. Appellee's opening brief filed May 20, 1991), the State also 
conceded the inapplicability of Rule 609 for a nondefendant witness. 
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CONCLUSION 
Timothy Duncan requests a rehearing by this Court to 
determine whether Rule 609(a)(1) applies to the convictions of a 
State witness, regardless of how the conviction was ultimately 
classified. 
SUBMITTED this T day of June, 1991. 
s: 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATION 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this case; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to unnecessarily delay disposition of this 
matter. , 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this -T day of June, 1991. 
LONflLD S . FUJ RONA  . INO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this T day of June, 1991. 
onald S. ^ un R aldsTFu5ino 
DELIVERED by this day 
of June, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Timothy Kevin Duncan, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MAY 10 m\ 
MaS/r Noonan 
GJerk of ths Court 
Otefi.Court at AppM& 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900217-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 10, 1991) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Attorneys: Charles F. Loyd, Jr. and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Russon. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant, Timothy Kevin Duncan, appeals his jury 
conviction of theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990), and receiving stolen 
property, a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-408 and § 76-6-4 12(1)(a)(i) (1989). Duncan asserts that 
the trial court erred in prohibiting impeachment of a 
prosecution witness with a prior criminal conviction, 
affirm Duncan's conviction. 
We 
BACKGROUND 
On July 8, 1989, a used plasma cutter and a 
charger were stolen from "Mike's Auto Body" shop 
City, Utah. Both items were pawned in Salt Lake 
Duncan's signature appeared on the pawn receipt. 
1989, Duncan was charged with receiving stolen property, a 
used battery 
in Salt Lake 
City. 
On August 29, 
second degree felony, and with theft by deception, a class B 
misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Duncan sought a ruling from the 
trial court to allow him to impeach the prosecution's chief 
witness, Mike Skillings. Shillings was the owner of Mike's 
Auto Body. 
Skillings had been charged in 1986 with unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony. He had pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of 
attempted unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony. The trial court then entered a conviction 
for Skillings1 offense as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990). This statute provides that 
(1) If the court, having regard to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty 
and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes that it would be 
unduly harsh to record the conviction as 
being for that category of offense 
established by statute and to sentence 
the defendant to an alternative normally 
applicable to that offense, the court 
may, unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law, enter a judgment of 
conviction for that next lower category 
of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a 
felony, the conviction shall be deemed 
to be a misdemeanor if: 
(a) The judge designates that 
sentence to be for a misdemeanor and the 
sentence imposed is within the limits 
provided by law for a misdemeanor . . . . 
As a result, Skillings' offense was denoted as attempted 
unlawful distribution for value of a controlled substance, a 
class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to twelve months in jail 
with eighteen months probation. 
Duncan moved for permission to use Skillings' guilty plea 
to impeach his testimony pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a), 
Rule 609(a) provides as follows: 
900217-CA 2 
For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that 
he has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime 
(1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, 
and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved 
dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
The trial court denied Duncan's pretrial motion to impeach 
Skillings' testimony with his 1986 conviction, concluding that 
the conviction could not be used for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609(a)(1) because it was a misdemeanor not punishable by 
imprisonment in excess of one year and did not involve a crime 
of dishonesty or false statement. It stated: 
The court concludes that the order of 
May 2nd, 1986, signed by Judge Sawaya is 
the actual conviction. That on its face 
indicates that the crime is attempted 
unlawful distribution for value of a 
controlled substance, a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Accordingly, under 609(a), the court 
concludes that it is not a conviction 
involving imprisonment for over one 
year. So, for that reason, I will not 
allow you to use that for impeachment 
purposes. 
Subsequently, Skillings was allowed to testify as to the 
fair market value of the used battery charger and used plasma 
cutter that were stolen from his auto repair shop. After a 
jury trial, Duncan was convicted as charged. He was sentenced 
1. Skillings testified that the stolen property's value 
exceeded $1,000, thus constituting a second degree felony under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) rather than a lesser crime 
under subsections (b), (c), or (d), if the property were valued 
at less than $1,000. 
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to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years for the felony and 
six months for the misdemeanor. 
On appeal, Duncan argues the trial court erred in 
excluding evidence about the prior criminal conviction of 
State's witness Skillings. 
ANALYSIS 
We must determine whether a plea of guilty to a felony 
should be considered a felony conviction for impeachment 
purposes under Rule 609(a)(1) when a judgment of conviction was 
subsequently entered for a misdemeanor pursuant to a statute 
that allows a judge to enter a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower category of offense. 
Duncan argues that by excluding evidence of Skillings' 
prior conviction, the court deprived him of an effective means 
of impeaching Skillings* credibility. He contends that when 
Skillings pleaded guilty to a third degree felony charge, his 
plea constituted the "conviction" for impeachment purposes. 
Further, he claims that a subsequent reduction of the crime 
should not nullify the operation of his guilty plea as a 
conviction for impeachment purposes. We disagree. 
When a challenge to a trial court's decision concerns a 
question of law, we accord no particular deference, but review 
for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985). Statutory interpretation presents a question of 
law. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 
1989); State v. Seroente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
We begin by determining the applicable definition of 
"conviction" under Rule 609(a), noting that courts have 
utilized differing interpretations. At common law, the court 
had to enter a judgment on the finding of guilt before a person 
was "convicted" of a crime. Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 496 
A.2d 312, 313 (1985) (citing 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law § 521, at 731 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1979). In recent 
cases, the definition turns upon the context and the purpose 
within which the term "conviction" is used. _LcL at 313; see 
also Conlow v. State, 441 A.2d 638, 639 (Del. 1982) (per 
curiam); State v. Eoe, 274 N.W. 2d 350, 355 (Iowa 1979). For 
example, an ordinary or popular usage refers to guilt by 
verdict or plea before, and independent of, the judgment of the 
court. Myers, 496 A.2d at 313; State v. Hanna, 179 N.W. 2d 
503, 508 (Iowa 1970) . 
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On the other hand, when applying a legal and technical 
meaning, "conviction" refers to the final judgment entered on 
the plea or verdict of guilty. Vasouez v. Courtney, 537 P.2d 
536, 537 (Oregon 1975) ("The second, more technical meaning of 
conviction refers to the final judgment entered on a plea or 
verdict of guilty. In the latter case conviction has not been 
accomplished until the judgment is made by the court"); Mvers, 
496 A.2d at 315 ("[A] person is not 'convicted1 of an offense 
until the court enters a judgment upon the verdict of guilty"). 
Duncan, citing State v. Delsshmutt, 676 P.2d 383 (Utah 
1983) (per curiam), contends that the relevant reference point 
for impeachment purposes is the guilty plea and not the 
judgment of conviction. In Delashmutt, the defendant appealed 
his felony convictions on grounds that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress evidence of a prior guilty plea 
to a felony in Washington where sentence had not been imposed. 
The court held that "a prior plea of guilty to a felony is a 
conviction that must be answered by an accused . . . . " I£. at 
384. 
Subsequent to Delashmutt, however, doubts have surfaced as 
to its continued viability.~ In State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam), the supreme court upheld denial of 
the defendant's petition for expungement of his conviction 
because of an inadequate record on appeal. The supreme court 
found that the entry of a guilty plea alone did not constitute 
a conviction to justify possible expungement. 
Our examination of the record fails 
to disclose any conviction of defendant 
to be expunged. . . . There is nothing 
in the record before this Court to show 
any acceptance of the guilty plea, 
findings, conviction, judgment, or 
imposition of sentence by the lower 
court upon defendant. 
2. In State v. Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1990), 
this court stated that "Delashmutt has questionable value as 
precedent. Significant case law concerning the nature of 
guilty pleas has developed since Delashmutt which gives doubt 
to its continued vitality." 13. at 30 n.2, (citing State v. 
Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987)); State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 
1294, 1303-05 (Utah 1986). Morrell also observed that "[i]n 
view of the liberality with which motions to withdraw guilty 
pleas are to be granted prior to sentence . . . we see real 
difficulty, for Rule 609(a)(2) purposes, in equating a mere 
guilty plea, prior to sentencing, with an actual conviction." 
Hi. 
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Without any indication in the 
record of the proceedings below 
concerning the disposition of the second 
degree felony charge against defendant, 
we cannot determine in what manner the 
court acted. It is possible that the 
court intended to enter defendant's 
conviction, impose sentence which was 
stayed, and place defendant on 
probation. But the record does not so 
indicate. 
Id. at 308 (footnote omitted). 
Theison recognizes that guilty pleas can be modified or 
even nullified by subsequent events. Equating a guilty plea 
with a conviction is therefore a questionable practice. 
Further dilution of Delashmutt is found in State v. 
g_alleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987), where the defendant 
appealed from a denial of his presentence motion to withdraw 
his plea of guilty to aggravated sexual assault. The supreme 
court held that, entry of a plea of guilty involves waiver of 
important constitutional rights, a presentence motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea should be liberally granted. Id. at 
1041-42. Likewise, in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 
1986), the supreme court emphasized the non-finality of guilty 
pleas prior to sentencing. Therefore, we read Utah cases to 
mean that when the crime encompassed in a guilty plea is later 
modified by withdrawal of the plea or the court's judgment, the 
later action defines the actual conviction. 
We also look to interpretations of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence for guidance. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1334 (Utah 1986). Federal cases that discuss guilty pleas for 
purposes of impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) are 
scarce, but suggest that a guilty plea to a crime not involving 
dishonesty or false statement can be used to impeach a witness 
only where it has resulted in conviction at a felony level. 
See United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 545 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) . 
However, prior to the 1975 adoption of the present federal 
rules, the "settled view" was that a guilty plea upon which 
conviction had not been entered could not be used to impeach a 
witness. United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206, 1208 (2nd 
Cir. 1970); Crawford v. United States, 41 F.2d 979, 980 (D.C. 
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Cir. 1930) (also citing five state cases). See also United 
States v. Lee, 509 F.2d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying 
District of Columbia code provision identical to Rule 609(a)). 
The contrary view was espoused in United States v. Turner, 497 
F.2d 406, 408 (10th Cir. 1974), and appellant urges us to adopt 
that view here. Turner, however, does not appear to be widely 
followed, if at all. Therefore, given its minority status, 
along with the non-final nature of a guilty plea, as evidenced 
in recent Utah decisions, we decline to adopt the Turner 
approach of equating a guilty plea with a conviction for Rule 
609(a)(1) impeachment purposes. 
We finally revisit the text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 
(1990), under which witness Skillings' conviction was reduced 
to a class A misdemeanor. Subsection (2)(a) states that a 
felony upon which a misdemeanor sentence is imposed shall be 
deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. In interpreting 
statutes, we "give effect, if possible, to every word of the 
statute." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 
1988); £££ also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1990) (words in 
statutes generally construed by context and approved usage). 
Duncan's argument would require us, in effect, to construe 
section 76-3-402 to mean that a felony sentenced as a 
misdemeanor shall be deemed a misdemeanor except when the 
offense is needed to impeach the defendant under Rule 
609(a)(1). The language of section 76-3-402 simply does not 
support this exception. Instead, the language indicates that a 
guilty defendant who is considered worthy of a reduced sentence 
should receive all the advantages that go with such leniency. 
Those advantages include the privilege not to have certain 
transgressions used later to impeach credibility. 
In view of the foregoing, we hold that it is the final 
judgment of the court on a guilty verdict or plea that 
constitutes a conviction for impeachment purposes under Rule 
609(a)(1). It is this "conviction" which reflects the final 
determination of the seriousness of the acts committed and, as 
a result, its relevance for impeachment purposes. Therefore, 
Skillings' guilty plea to a felony is not controlling, but 
3. Section 68-3-11 also states that "technical words and 
phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law . . . are to be construed according 
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition." As 
already discussed, we have adopted the "technical" meaning of 
the word "conviction" for Rule 609(a)(1) purposes. 
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rather the subsequent judgment of conviction of a misdemeanor 
controls. Since the conviction was not for a felony punishable 
by more than a year incarceration, and is not asserted to be 
for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, it could 
not be used to impeach Skillings.4 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly excluded the use of witness 
Skillings' misdemeanor conviction for impeachment purposes 
under Rule 609(a)(1). Accordingly, appellant Duncan's 
conviction in the instant case is affirmed. 
.^^^i 7~ *gL 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
f?52Z^4z^^ 
Norman H. Jackson,^Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
4. See State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (possession of controlled substance is crime not 
involving dishonesty or false statement). See also State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653-56 (Utah 1989) (discussing 
"credibility-deteriorating quality" of crime admissible under 
Rule 609(a)(2)) . 
Because Skillings' conviction was not punishable by more 
than one year incarceration, the requirement of Rule 609(a)(1) 
to balance the prejudicial and probative aspects of evidence of 
the conviction does not apply. Therefore, we do not address 
appellant's arguments about the applicability of that 
requirement where the impeached witness is not the defendant. 
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